
RS&iji 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. 



\y 






UNITED STATES OP AMERICA, t 



DEFENCE OF CANADA 



rONSIDERED AS 



AN IMPERIAL QUESTION 



WITH REFERENCE TO 



A WAS WITH AMERICA. 




J. L. A. SIMMONS, C.B. 



COLONEL ROYAL ENGINEERS, AND MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE OTTOMAN ARMY. 



{library of congress,! 






UNITED STATES OP AMERICA, i 

LONDON: 
LONGMAN, GREEN, LONGMAN, ROBERTS, & GREEN. 

1865. 






LONDON 

PRINTED 3T SPOTTISWOODE AND CO, 

NEW-STREET SQUARE 



If 

o 
© 



sr 



THE 



DEFENCE OF CANADA 



Although in the late debates in Parliament it has 
been elicited from the Government that ' there is no 
danger of war with America, and that nothing tha:; 
has recently passed indicates any hostile disposition 
on the part of the United States,' the country may 
congratulate itself that the debates have taken place, 
as, without giving any just cause of offence to the 
United States, the policy of England with respect 
to the defence of Canada has been clearly declared, 
and with such perfect unanimity that the conse- 
quences of an attack on Canada cannot fail to be 
appreciated. 

All parties, however much they may differ as to 
the measures to be taken for the defence of Canada, 
agree with Lord Palmerston, that ' this is not a Cana- 
dian question ; that it is not a local question ; but 
that it is an Imperial question :' in other words, that 
an attack of Canada means war with Great Britain — 

A 2 



not only in Canada, for the defence of Canada, but 
wherever a British ship can meet an American ship, 
or a British soldier can grapple an American soldier. 

War with America is not a war of 21,000,000 of 
Federal Americans, or 31,000,000 if the Union should 
be re-established, against 3,250,000 of Her Majesty's 
North American subjects, supported by 29,000,000 
of inhabitants of Great Britain, at a distance of 3,000 
miles, but war against the whole of Her Majesty's 
dominions, including 9,000,000 of her subjects dis- 
tributed throughout the colonies, and 135,000,000 
in India. 

As in war the great object sought is to gain an 
honourable and advantageous peace by inflicting the 
greatest amount of injury on the enemy, whilst 
warding off as much as possible all harm from our- 
selves, it is evident that the country which acts on 
the offensive must always be at an advantage as 
compared with that which acts on the defensive. In 
an offensive war, the enemy suffers from the incon- 
veniences and horrors of war ; and, if waged success- 
fully, there must always be, in treating for peace, 
some territory or advantage to surrender in return 
for an equivalent : whereas in a purely defensive war, 
however successful, peace can only be purchased by 
a cession of rights or territory, or both. 

If these principles be correct, war with America 
upon the basis of the defence of Canada must result 
in disaster ; and it would appear that a mistake has 






been made in discussing the best mode of carrying- 
on war with America purely with reference to this 
object. 

War involves, in the first instance, the defence of 
Great Britain and Ireland, the heart and life of the 
empire ; and after that, of her colonies, possessions, 
aod commerce. 

To consider the probabilities of war with the 
United States with reference solely to the defence of 
Canada, is to reduce the question of Avar to a Canadian 
question. It does not even assign to it the dimen- 
sions of a Colonial question, which would embrace the 
maritime provinces of Xorth America, Bermuda, the 
West Indies, and other colonies ; and much less does 
it give to it the importance of an Imperial question. 
To accept the defence of Canada as the issue of war, 
is also at once to give up the selection of the seat of 
war, which in itself is an enormous advantage. 

Great Britain being separated from the United 
States b} 7 an ocean, it is evident that war can only 
be waged through the intervention of the navy ; the 
mode of operating in war must therefore depend, in 
the first instance, on the navy ; and, considering the 
vast importance and the great difficulty which con- 
fessedly surround the question of Avar Avith the 
United States, it seems reasonable that the considera- 
tion of the most efficacious means for prosecuting it, 
should be referred to the most experienced naval 
officers in consultation with the most experienced 



military officers, with whom might be associated 
some others specially qualified, whose experience 
in the resources of the empire and in the conduct 
of public affairs, combined with a knowledge of 
America, might regulate the deliberations of the 
naval and military men, and keep them within the 
limits of the possible. 

Such a deliberate consideration of the possibility 
of war with the United States would, without a 
publication of details, carry weight with the country ; 
it would ensure the acceptance of the recommenda- 
tions emanating from it, and would not lead to debates 
on the defence of Canada ; but the subject would be 
treated as an Imperial question of Imperial magni- 
tude, in a way which would probably carry convic- 
tion and obtain the concurrence of Parliament. 

Looking at the possibility of war from this point 
of view, the first thing that presents itself is the 
necessity for blockading the American coasts, with 
the double object of keeping open the navigation of 
the sea for the commerce of Great Britain, and of 
maintaining the communications for military pur- 
poses between Great Britain and her colonies. Unless 
this blockade be established and maintained, Ame- 
rican ships of war would be met with on all parts of 
the ocean ; the conveyance of stores, materials, or 
reinforcements to any of the colonies would be 
attended with risk, and American cruisers might 
even be found preying on British commerce in 



British waters. The true mode of protecting British 
ships on the sea would be by establishing a strict 
blockade on the American coast, and, if possible, 
driving the American flag from the ocean. 

Considering the development of the American 
navy during the present civil war, this blockade can 
only be maintained by powerful ships, capable of 
moving at high speed, with a proportion of iron- 
clad vessels which could hold their own against the 
iron-clad navy of America. For the maintenance of 
these ships upon the coast of America, large supplies 
of fuel near at hand are requisite, and docks for 
repairs and for keeping the bottoms of the ships free 
from weed and other substances which may retard 
their speed. Docks also are required for refitting 
ships after an action. Without such depots and 
docks, there would always be a risk that a disastrous 
gale of wind, or a severe naval action, even though 
successful, might deprive us for a time of the services 
of the blockading fleet, and set free a number of 
cruisers to prey upon commerce in all parts of the 
world, and to embarrass our communications with the 
colonies. 

It would therefore appear essential to the mainten- 
ance of the blockade, that advantage should be taken 
of our Transatlantic possessions, to establish dock- 
yards and depots of fuel in suitable positions with 
reference to the coast of the United States, and to 
place them by fortification in conditions of perfect 



safety. Fortunately, Great Britain has possessions 
most favourably situated for establishing these neces- 
sary depots and dockyards in the maritime provinces 
of North America, in Bermunda, and in the West 
Indies, 

The fall of New Orleans, and more lately that of 
Fort Fisher, has clearly shown, that in presence of 
the means of attack which in the course of four 
years of war have been developed in America, works 
for the defence of these dockyards must be of the 
most substantial character and of large extent, and 
that they must be defended by numerous garrisons, 
probably not much less than 15,000 men for each. 

Without these fortified bases of operations for the 
navy off the coast of North America, a blockade 
would, on account of its great length — 3,000 miles — 
and distance from England, be almost impossible, 
(even with them it would be most difficult,) and 
American ships of war and Alabamas would swarm ; 
so that the operation of maintaining supplies and 
reinforcing an army in Canada, even when the navi- 
gation was not closed by the rigour of the climate, 
would be attended with great risk and vast losses, 
not to speak of the direct effect upon the general 
commerce of the country, and the indirect effect 
produced among the manufacturing population by 
the great diminution of our export trade. 

It is a primary condition, therefore, to the main- 
tenance of an army in Canada, that these fortified 



9 

positions should be occupied, in order to protect the 
line of communication from Great Britain to her 
army in the field. 

There are other considerations, moreover, which 
point to. the same necessity. Until the overland 
route is well established by the settlement of the 
country, and by the construction of railroads from 
the United States to California, the passage from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific across the Isthmus between 
North and South America must be of great strategi- 
cal importance. 

Great Britain by her Indian possessions ought, in 
a war with the United States, to be mistress of the 
Pacific ; but this commanding position might be im- 
perilled if the Americans could secure easy com- 
munication from the Atlantic States to California. 
This would be best prevented by closing the passage 
of the Isthmus, which might be effected by naval 
means, based on a good and secure dockyard and 
depot in one of Her Majesty's West Indian posses- 
sions. 

If this were done, probably the most effective 
means of attacking the United States, and carrying 
war into their territories, would be by a well-planned 
expedition from India, in which Her Majesty's Indian 
subjects could be employed with effect without draw- 
ing on her European subjects, who are more difficult 
to procure in numbers and more costly to maintain. 

Her Majesty's Australian subjects might also be 

a2 



10 

inclined to assist in such an enterprise, which would 
tend greatly to the security of the rising cities on 
their coasts, and of their trade. 

An attack of this sort would also be the best mode 
of defending British Columbia, and of protecting Bri- 
tish commerce in the Indian and Chinese seas ; but 
all would hinge on the establishment of a defensive 
position in the West Indies. Without such an at- 
tack on California, a blockading squadron on the 
west coast of America, in the Pacific, with a fortified 
dockyard in support, would be necessary for the secu- 
rity of the commerce in the Pacific and Indian seas. 

It will thus be seen that the primary effect of these 
fortified naval depots in the Atlantic, on the east coast 
of America, would be to assist the blockade of the 
American coast, and to that extent to secure the 
commerce of Great Britain with other parts of the 
world, to protect the line of communications from 
Great Britain to her colonies, and more especially to 
the British North American possessions, and to a 
great extent to sever California from the United 
States, and localise the war in the Atlantic, instead 
of allowing it to spread all over the world, to all the 
colonies, and wherever British commerce might 
extend. 

Backed also by the army in England, these forti- 
fied stations would have a marked result in compel- 
ling the maintenance of strong garrisons, which, in 
the aggregate, would not amount probably to less 






11 



than 150,000 or 200,000 men in the great cities and 
harbours all along the Atlantic coast, and to that ex- 
tent of compelling an outlay of men and money, and 
thus crippling the resources of the United States, and 
occupying armies which might otherwise be used to 
augment the forces employed against Canada. 

The above measures, which would probably absorb 
from 40,000 to 50,000 effective men, are necessary 
for the defence of the empire at home, and in her 
colonies and possessions, before placing a single sol- 
dier in Canada as a theatre of war. They are ancil- 
lary to operations in Canada, and will act as a diver- 
sion in favour of them ; but these latter must be 
conducted independently, from a secure base, upon 
the true and strict principles established by the 
experience of war, no departure from which is sanc- 
tioned by the experience of the war now raging be- 
tween the Federal and Confederate States. 

The first condition of war is a secure base of 
operations. The importance of a fortress into which 
the Government of Canada may, in case of danger, 
retire, and from which the resources of the colony 
may be directed, has been well shown in a letter 
lately published in the ' Times ' by General Sir E. 
Cust. The position which, so far as Canada is con- 
cerned, is best calculated to fulfil the necessary con- 
ditions of a secure base of operations, is Quebec. 
Naturally strong, and in a position where for six 
months in each year it can be in direct communica- 



12 

tion with Great Britain by her fleets, and, as it 
were, the seaport of Canada, Quebec is undoubtedly 
the true base of operations for carrying on war in 
Canada, and therefore, as the Government of Canada 
must cooperate in war with the Home Government, 
it is there that it should establish itself immediately 
on the outbreak of hostilities. 

Notwithstanding all that has been said as to the 
possibility of a campaign in front of Quebec during 
the winter months, all those who know the countfy, 
and have experience of its climate and the effects 
of frost in hardening the ground, will feel perfect 
confidence that, although hostilities may be continued 
for a month or six weeks after the close of* the navi- 
gation, during which the defence of Quebec might 
be left to its own unaided resources, the attack of a 
fortress in winter is almost an impossibility ; "and the 
utmost that could be done, even if the army could 
keep the field, would be to blockade it, with the hope 
of reducing it by starvation — which, considering the 
facilities for keeping stores in winter, could only be 
the result of gross neglect on the part of the defend- 
ers. Quebec, therefore, with the support of the fleet 
in summer, and of its rigorous climate in winter, fur- 
nishes many of the conditions requisite for a secure 
base of operations. It has, however, a great defect, 
in consequence of its distance from the shores of the 
Atlantic, and the difficulty of keeping up a commu- 
nication between it and Great Britain during the 



13 

time that the navigation of the St. Lawrence is 
closed. 

Unfortunately, the frontier of the United States is 
unpleasantly near to the road from Quebec to Halifax ; 
and although no railroads have as yet been made 
leading from the interior of the United States to the 
frontier, they have been completed to a point within 
sixty miles from it, from which there are common 
roads leading to it ; and the population of New 
Brunswick, which only numbers 250,000 souls, is 
not sufficient to prevent an inroad upon the line of 
communication from Quebec to Halifax, and to keep 
it open. It would therefore be necessary, if this road 
were to be kept open, to augment the Colonial forces 
in New Brunswick, and probably to assist them in 
their defence by opening roads, and by fortifying 
one or more well-selected positions, by acting from 
which the great intercolonial road might be secured 
from insult, except from occasional raids by small 
bodies of men, which the experience of the present 
war in America has shown cannot be prevented in a 
closely-wooded country with a very sparse popula- 
tion. 

To provide also for keeping up a communication 
with the Government and troops in Canada, a line of 
telegraph along the north shore of the St. Lawrence, 
and across the straits of Belle Isle to Newfoundland, 
would be of very great benefit, as it would be in 
perfect security when the navigation was closed,— 



14 

that is, provided its Atlantic terminus were duly 
protected ; and without it, information would rarely 
reach England during the winter months as to the 
state of affairs in Canada beyond that, the publica- 
tion of which might be permitted by the authorities 
of the United States. 

Quebec, being fortified, would naturally become 
the object of attack in case of war with the United 
States. History tells us that the mode of attack 
upon Quebec by the forces of the United States 
under Arnold and Montgomery, in 1775, was by 
columns advancing from the State of Maine along 
the course of the Kennebec, and from Montreal. 

These lines of advance nearly coincide with those 
which armies might take in the present day. The 
railroad from Portland by Eichmond gives one line 
of advance, and the river St. Lawrence from Montreal 
gives another. Any British army, therefore, ope- 
rating beyond Quebec must embrace both of these 
lines in its operations. The experience of the war in 
America has clearly shown, notwithstanding Sher- 
man's exceptional and unopposed march from Atlanta 
through Georgia to Savannah, that military move- 
ments on a large scale by armies capable of attacking 
a fortress such as Quebec ought to be, can only be 
made along a line of railroad or navigation. Now, as 
the railroad from Portland leads direct upon Quebec, 
it would appear that the first defence of Quebec 
should be maintained in advance on the line of that 



15 

railroad, and the more so as that railroad is also 
one of the most favourable lines for advance upon 
Montreal 

By taking up a strong position, if such can be 
found, near the American frontier, which is ninety 
miles from the St. Lawrence at this point, fortifying 
and occupying it in force, the line of railroad would 
be covered ; the resources to be derived from a 
population of 400,000 souls between the frontier 
and St. Lawrence would be secured ; a threatening 
position would be assumed, from which offensive 
measures might be taken, within the territory of the 
United States ; an army would be placed in a posi- 
tion which would render an advance by Lake 
Champlain upon Montreal more difficult than it 
otherwise would be, and necessitate the employment 
of a much more powerful army for that enterprise ; 
and, if occupied in conjunction with a position on 
the Kichelieu river in advance of Montreal, would 
go far towards placing that city in security. With- 
out the occupation of an advanced position on this 
railroad, the country through which it runs would 
be lost, facilities would be afforded by the rail- 
road itself for combined movements upon Montreal 
and Quebec, and even a position might possibly be 
taken on the St. Lawrence which might embarrass, 
if not sever, the communication by water between 
Quebec and Montreal. 

If such a position could be taken on the St. Law- 



16 



rence, Montreal would soon be left to its own unaided 
resources, as there is no communication except by 
indifferent country roads on the north of the St. 
Lawrence between the two cities. 

An advanced position on the Portland railroad 
appears, therefore, to be an essential condition in the 
defence of Canada ; and, considering that the troops 
allotted for its defence would not improbably have 
to operate against an army such as that with which 
General Grant has captured Eichmond, it would not 
be too much to assign to it a force of 50,000 men, 
including the garrison of Quebec, which, so long as 
a field force remained in its front, would not require 
to be numerous. 

An army in such a position, by threatening the 
line of operations of an American force acting against 
New Brunswick, would also be of great value for 
the protection of the intercolonial line of communi- 
cation from Quebec to the ocean. 

For the defence of a position on the Kichelieu, in 
front of Montreal, it would not be too much, for the 
same reasons, to assign also a force of 50,000 men : 
but this even would not provide for the defence of 
Montreal, if attacked from the west as well as from 
the south. With respect to operations of war also 
to the west of Montreal, it is to be observed that the 
chmate of Western Canada is by no means so rigorous 
as that of Eastern Canada, and that unquestionably 
military operations may be conducted throughout 



17 

the winter in it, when assistance from Great Britain 
would be almost, if not altogether, impossible. 

These forces may seem large ; but, considering 
that all operations which may be undertaken to the 
west of Montreal would depend on the integrity of 
the country between them and Quebec, it would be 
as essential for their success to secure that country, 
as it is certain that, with the experience the Federal 
generals have acquired in war, they would attack 
that country if undefended, and so isolate the corps 
operating to the westward, and cut them off from 
Quebec, and from all communication with Great Bri- 
tain, upon which they would depend for supplies of 
arms and ammunition, and for reinforcements of men. 

In discussing the possibility of war with America, 
an army of 30,000 or 40,000 men is frequently 
spoken of as the utmost that Great Britain could 
send forth and maintain in the field in America. If 
this be the case, it is useless to consider the warlike 
measures to be taken for carrying on war on land, 
as the whole of the able-bodied population derived 
from 2,500,000 Canadians, if willing to leave their 
homes unprotected for the defence of their country, 
and aided only by a small contingent of 30,000 or 
40,000 men, could never carry on a successful war 
against the able-bodied population to be derived 
from 31,000,000 of the United States. Without 
derogating from the character of the Canadians, it is 
evident that such a contest would be only a repeti- 



18 

tion, with no very great difference in the odds, of 
the Prussian and Austrian war against the Danes in 
1864, and of that which has now terminated so 
disastrously for the Confederates. 

In the same way that the American armies have 
grown with the existing war until they are numbered 
by hundreds of thousands, and that Great Britain, in 
1813, after twenty-one years of war, with only a 
population of 18,000,000, had 853,000* men under 
arms, a war with America or any other great power 
would soon cause the numbers of the British army 
to be increased to a par with that of the army to 
which it would be opposed. When once the honour 
of the country was involved, it could never allow its 
armies to be driven from the field for want of num- 
bers, but would again, by some means, which would 
certainly be forthcoming when required, augment its 
forces to the required strength. Will it not be wise, 

* Sailors and Marines 140,000 

Regular Army . . . . . . . . 237,000 

Regular Militia 83,000 

Yeomanry Cavalry 65,000 

Local Militia ........ 288,000 

Militia in Canada 40,000 

Total . . . ■ . . 853,000 
Native Indian Army 200,000 

Total ... . . 1,053,000 



(Lord CastlereagK s Speech, Nov. 11, 1813.) 



19 

therefore, to look the possibility of a war boldly in 
the face, and to calculate the cost in men and means, 
and not, by commencing it with inadequate prepara- 
tions, and upon an imperfectly matured plan, to risk 
a defeat, which would cause a loss of prestige that 
no nation, however powerful, can afford at the out- 
break of a war, and thus increase the difficulties of 
conducting it enormously ? To be drawn into a large 
war by degrees, commencing it as a small war, is 
a very dangerous policy; such a proceeding would 
tend to give confidence to an enemy, and to destroy 
it proportionately in ourselves, and might be pro- 
ductive of political complications, attended with great 
danger to the empire : it would tend also to protract 
the war ; and as, eventually, at least the same force 
which if employed at first might have been success- 
ful, will be required to bring it to a successful issue, 
such a policy must necessarily be attended with 
increased expenditure. 

Such a policy would be a repetition of that by 
which it was thought to frighten the Emperor 
Nicholas out of the Danubian Principalities, by send- 
ing 10,000 men as a demonstration to Malta, and of 
that which sent a weak division of 1,0000 men to 
America at the time of the Trent affair, when it was 
successful, because of the heavy work which the 
Americans then had in hand, but which would only 
have tended, in all human probability, to bring about 



20 

the war which was then imminent, if the Federals, 
with their present military organisation, had been 
free from other and more pressing engagements, and 
ready to commence operations against us. 

The history of the military preparations in connec- 
tion with the Trent affair has yet to be written, and 
an account given of the strategical arrangements by 
which an insignificant division, as compared with the 
armies at the disposal of the Federal States, was dis- 
tributed in small detachments over an exposed fron- 
tier, extending some 900 miles, from London, in 
Western Canada, to the ocean, without any military 
organisation in the colonies to support it. 

The success of this demonstration may blind the 
eyes of political students, and cause them to attribute 
to military vigour a result which was wholly due to 
the apprehension on the part of the Federals that, 
by a declaration of war, the Southern ports might 
be opened, and the Confederates assisted in their 
struggle for independence ; but the military student 
will see in it a movement which was utterly valueless 
in a military point of view, and only excusable as a 
manifest declaration to the Federal States that Great 
Britain was in earnest, and intended war if the Con- 
federate Commissioners were not surrendered. 

In view of the great armies at the disposal of the 
United States, the forces already enumerated appear 
small, viz. : — 



21 

50,000 men for the defence of dockyards and 
naval depots ; 

50,000 men in front of Quebec and in that for- 
tress ; 

50,000 men in front of and to the south of 
Montreal 

If defensive operations should be undertaken to 
the west of Montreal, these forces would require to 
be increased in a very large- proportion for the 
defence of the communications above that city. 
Unfortunately, there is a line of railroad along the 
south of the St. Lawrence, at some distance from 
the frontier, extending from Lake Huron to Montreal, 
and thence through Eichmond to Quebec, which is 
joined at various points by other railways leading up 
from the interior of the United States. The power 
of locomotion afforded by these railroads is of enor- 
mous advantage to the Americans either for attack 
or defence ; whereas the communications in Canada 
are badly arranged for military purposes. The Great 
St. Lawrence Canal above Montreal is in part on the 
south side of the river, can be easily destroyed, and 
is therefore difficult to be defended ; the railroad 
from Montreal to the west is close to the river on its 
north bank, and very open to attack. The only 
other communication is by the Kicleau Canal, which 
was made by the British Government, at an expense 
of near ^1,000,000, in 1826, expressly as a line of 



22 

military communication from Montreal to Lake 
Ontario. This canal, which was made for the navi- 
gation of ordinary canal-boats not drawing more 
than 4^ or 5 feet of water, is unfortunately quite 
inadequate in the present day for the supply of an 
army, is not well adapted for a naval communication 
betiveen the ocean and the lakes, and is difficult also 
to protect. 

Operations, therefore, to the west of Montreal 
would require very large forces to protect the line of 
communications in rear of them. Such operations 
would be by no means impossible, but should not be 
undertaken without a very careful consideration of 
the mode of conducting them, and a calculation of 
the means in men and materials requisite to ensure 
their success. Without an ample provision ;of such 
means, it would be an act of madness to attempt any 
serious operations on a large scale in that country, as 
they would infallibly lead to disaster. 

The geographical conformation of Canada is natu- 
rally unfavourable for defence. It is a long narrow 
strip of land in the basin of the St. Lawrence, skirting 
that river, with a wall of impenetrable forest to its 
north, and exposed at every point to an irruption from 
the south. It stands, therefore, to reason, that any 
force entering this narrow strip of country or gorge 
from the sea, and extending its operations westwards, 
must have one flank and its rear open to attack, and 
be placed, therefore, under very great disadvantage. 



23 

Any general who would advance a force in such a 
country, unless his flank and rear were well pro- 
tected, would entirely neglect the first principles of 
war, and invite defeat by a repetition of the same 
movements which have proved so eminently successful 
in Sherman's advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 
and thence northwards through Carolina in rear of 
Charleston, and now again in Grant's last successful 
attack of the lines in front of Eichmond, and in his 
pursuit of Lee's army. 

The question of the defence of Canada is one in 
which the advantages must be carefully balanced 
against the disadvantages. In the first place, it re- 
quires consideration, whether, in a war between Great 
Britain and the United States, Imperial interests would 
be best promoted by the defence of Canada, whether 
wholly or in part, or by allowing the temporary oc- 
cupation of the whole or a part of it, which, although 
greatly to be deprecated, would have but little effect 
on the general results of so great a war, probably 
very little as compared with the effects produced by 
the mere outbreak of war upon the commerce and 
fiscal condition of the two countries ; and if it should 
be decided that war should be carried on in Canada as 
a part of the general scheme for waging war against 
the United States, the question of conducting that 
war locally should be considered with reference to 
the means which could be placed at the disposal of 
the commanding general. 



24 

These notes are only intended as suggesting the 
general principles upon which war with the United 
States, if it should unhappily occur, should be car- 
ried on, and would require much amplification if it 
were attempted to fix the precise details and the 
strategical points to be taken up in a war for the de- 
fence of Canada. There can be no doubt of the vast 
importance of the subject ; and that the change which 
has supervened since the defence of the North Ameri- 
can Colonies was under the consideration of the 
Duke of Wellington — by whose advice the Imperial 
Government undertook the construction of the Eideau 
Canal and the fortifications of Kingston — is so great, 
that the whole subject is reopened. 

These changes consist in a vast increase of popu- 
lation in the United States, from 10,000,000 to 
31,000,000 ; in the construction of railroads and 
communications by which armies can be supplied 
and move in directions and with a rapidity which 
before was impossible ; in the development of a 
numerous and highly efficient army, commanded by 
generals who, although they may be thought lightly 
of by some for their short length of service and rapid 
promotion, have acquired, in four years of warfare 
on a scale such as has seldom been exceeded, a larger 
war experience than the great majority of the gene- 
rals of Europe, and have, by the operations which 
they have conducted, proved themselves adepts in 
strategy and very skilful tacticians. This war has 



25 



also created factories to supply the necessities of war, 
and an aptitude for war in the population which 
can only be acquired by practice ; as witness the 
transport of masses of men by railroad and by sea, 
the rapid construction of ships, the destruction and 
repair of railroads, and even their construction across 
natural obstacles, in a manner and with a rapidity 
which cast all engineering works executed in pre- 
vious wars entirely into the shade, and numerous 
other features of the present war. 

The whole aspect of the continent of North 
America, as regarded from a military point of view, 
has changed, and, as a natural consequence, the mode 
of carrying on war, if war should come, should be 
carefully weighed with reference to the altered cir- 
cumstances of the case. The present appears a very 
favourable opportunity for so doing, when, notwith- 
standing the successes which have of late attended 
the Federal arms, the pacification of the Confederate 
States is far from accomplished, and there may be 
time to consider the subject and make preparations. 
It does not follow that by so doing the probabilities 
of war will be increased, nor that justice to the 
United States denied, which Mr. Seward announces 
as the condition upon which Canada shall remain 
undisturbed ; but the Government of the Federal 
States would be strengthened in carrying into effect 
the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs 
of other countries, which the same gentleman declares 



26 



will, if the people approve it, be the policy of the 
United States after the war. 

Preparations against all contingencies, and a clear 
understanding on both sides of what war would en- 
tail, is probably the best preventive of war ; but, on 
the contrary, half-measures, like the display of a few 
thousand men at Malta previous to the Eussian war, 
tend to induce war, by involving the honour of the 
disputants, and exciting irritability and animosity one 
against the other. If such measures consisted in the 
distribution of a few thousand men along a very 
long line of frontier, in most exposed situations, even 
though fortified, they must be calculated to invite 
attack. 

In making these few observations, the question of 
the probability of war has not been entered upon, 
that being a subject within the peculiar province of 
the statesman, and upon which the writer, as a mili- 
tary man, does not venture to give an opinion. The 
possibility of war has been conceded, otherwise the 
question of the defence of Canada would never have 
been mooted ; and as the measures to be taken in con- 
sequence of this concession are under discussion, how- 
ever far distant it may be hoped by all that the day 
is when the apprehension will be realised, there can 
only be one desire that a question of such vast im- 
portance should be thoroughly ventilated, irrespective 
of party, and that such conclusions should be arrived 
at as shall bear the strict scrutiny, not only of friends 



27 

at home, but of possible opponents of great military 
experience who will seek to find a flaw in them, and 
who, if they do find a flaw, will be prone to take 
advantage of it to the detriment, not of Canadian, 
but of Imperial interests. 



LONDON 

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